New England Patriots: Darius Butler Signs, What About the Rest of the Picks?

The Pats made news today by signing second-round pick Darius Butler (cornerback) to a four-year deal worth about $3.9 million.

What’s more newsworthy is the fact that they’ve only signed two of their 12 total draft picks. This is a less-than-encouraging figure, but this will hopefully resolve itself by training camp (set to start July 30.)

It has become increasingly important to sign rookies by the start of camp, as the adjustment players face in transitioning from the college game to professional football is a harsh one. When a player misses camp, it seems he turns a learning curve into a learning cliff face.

Matt Leinart, JaMarcus Russell and Brady Quinn are but three examples of players who missed significant time because of holdouts and struggled early. The jury is still out as to whether any of the three will be successful pros.

What makes the Patriots’ situation more perplexing is the current state of sports economics. With the economy the way it is, players are more likely than ever to sign quickly, simply because they need the money in their pockets.

The numbers seem to bear this out. As ESPN’s Len Pasquarelli points out in this July 3 article, players are being signed at a relatively fast pace, indeed one of the fastest in modern memory.

Yet the Patriots seem to be bucking this trend, and at a relatively inconvenient time.

It is quite likely that, over the course of the season, the team will be forced to call upon rookies for some snaps (likely in the secondary), and it is imperative those players be well-drilled and versed in the intricacies of the game.

The CBA and the Patriots: What We Don’t Know Could Hurt Us

One story that has been monstrously under-reported is the end of the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement after the 2010 season.

For those who don’t know, the team owners voted in 2008 to opt out of the current agreement, arguing that the current system allocates too much revenue to the players. The players, obviously, disagree, and there has been very little reported progress since that announcement.

When the topic is mentioned, it’s normally in the context of the potential uncapped year causing havoc with the league’s finances.

Those who are more cynical point to a confluence of circumstances (such as the death of mostly-cooperative NFL Player’s Association head Gene Upshaw, pictured above with league commish Roger Goodell) that could lead to a work stoppage.

Truly, one of the reasons the NFL is the most popular sports league in America is because of its relatively long period without a strike or lockout.

A work stoppage could have the same deleterious effect as the 1994 Major League Baseball strike. That event damaged Major League Baseball to the point where it was only saved by the historic Mark McGwire/Sammy Sosa home run chase.

The truth is, even if the league and union come to a new agreement in time, the resulting agreement could cause a league-wide upheaval.

Let’s consider the last time the CBA was significantly changed. The 1993 update of the agreement created the salary cap system as we know it today.

When the salary cap was created, it caused a massive shift in the NFL. Teams that could not adapt to the cap became noncompetitive. There was a time when no team seemed to be good over multiple seasons, leading sportswriters to declare the end of the dynasty.

The cap hadn’t prevented the appearance of dominant teams—league front offices had merely failed to understand how to work in the new environment the cap created.

The Patriots became one of the first teams designed to work with the cap in mind. They build through low-cost draft picks and free agents. They ruthlessly cut players who can no longer help them. They demand cap-friendly, below-market deals from their stars.

In short, the Patriots’ personnel aim is to exploit the cap, and this approach has led to a perennially good team.

Now, should the new agreement sufficiently change the way salaries are handled in the league, what would this mean for the Patriots?

A comparison could be drawn with nature: Whenever the environment changes on a massive scale, it often becomes an extinction-level event. Species must either adapt or die.

In short, the team’s front office must be wary that the new agreement does not become the asteroid to their Tyrannosaurus.

The Pats and Personnel: Why Vince Wilfork Could Be a Problem

In the age of the 3-4 defense, good nose tackles are extremely hard to come by. The big men play an integral role in stopping the run and tying up blockers, sacrificing individual accomplishment for overall team success.

That’s why all of New England sat up and took notice when Vince Wilfork skipped OTAs over a contract dispute.

Luckily, the problem has resolved itself (Wilfork showed to the mandatory three-day minicamp), but this situation got me thinking about the dangerous game the Patriots play with personnel.

The advent of the salary-cap caused a huge re-alignment in the NFL. High-spending teams could once secure a core of talented players for their entire careers. Now, teams can no longer afford to retain the services of players who are past their primes.

The cap destroyed certain teams in the mid-to-late ’90s, as front offices struggled to comprehend the esoteric complexities that made up the new system. Media wags wrote eulogies for the age of dynasties.

The age hadn’t been slain—merely wounded.

One of the first consistently successful teams to emerge in the wake of that confusion was the New England Patriots. Bill Belichick and Scott Pioli took over an aging team mired in mediocrity, and slashed at it dispassionately.

Over the years, the team has rid itself of popular veterans like Lawyer Milloy, Ty Law, Ben Coates, and Drew Bledsoe without a second thought.

The cuts worked because they led to Super Bowl wins. Fans like championships more than individual players. Free agents were willing to sign with the team for below market value because it offered them a chance at a ring.

As someone once said, winning is a great deodorant.

As much as the cuts were necessary, though, the team has been exceptionally lucky. Each time, they gambled that a young understudy or cheap veteran would be able to take the place of an entrenched player. Each time, their gamble paid off.

That is, until Asante Samuel.

Samuel was the first great miscalculation of the Belichick/Pioli front office. His rookie contract ran out after the ’06 season, and he wanted to be paid commensurate with the other top corners in the league.

The team disagreed, leading to an eventual agreement that the franchise tag would be placed on Samuel for one year, after which he would be free to pursue other opportunities.

Samuel left, and the New England secondary hasn’t been the same since.

Another similar situation could be seen with the Eagles, who approach team-building the same way.

After a stellar season that led to a Super Bowl appearance, Terrell Owens asked the team to pay him in a way that reflected his production (he was slated to make $4.5 million). The team refused, and Owens was able to split the locker room in two.

Owens may be an instigator, but he had to have a point to win followers in the locker room. His contention: The Eagles underpaid players, then cut them once they became too expensive. Sound like another team you know?

The question has become: How long until the Pats personnel policy bites them once again? If another key cog (like Wilfork) leaves, how much harder will winning become?

The worst case scenario? An important player leaves the team, hurting its win total. Free agents see the team degrade, making them less likely to sign. The lack of new blood further wounds the team, and the vicious cycle continues.

Though the Patriots’ personnel policy may be a necessity in the salary-cap age, they must be sure to pay the right people the right amount.

Teams Should Be More Unconventional: Vick, The Wildcat, and David and Goliath

The most interesting thing about the Wildcat offense was not that it broke with conventional football wisdom, but that teams don’t break conventional wisdom that often.

Author Malcolm Gladwell, who wrote “Blink” and “Outliers,” points out in his latest article (available here) that when less-talented teams beat favorites (i.e., when David beats Goliath), they usually do so by adopting unconventional methods.

Gladwell uses the full-court press in basketball as an example, as it throws off the timing and rhythm of talented offensive teams. However, the same principles apply to football as well.

It’s telling to note when the Dolphins first broke out their new—or “so-old-it’s-new”—offense against the Patriots. This was a matchup in which there was a considerable gulf in talent. True, Tom Brady was hurt. But the Pats were a year removed from a perfect regular season while the Dolphins nearly went 0-16 the year before.

The new offense, though, caught the Patriots defense completely off-guard, resulting in a 38-13 shellacking. The game ended up being tremendously important, as the Dolphins won the AFC East while the Pats stayed home despite an 11-5 record.

This begs the question: why do less-talented teams seem perfectly happy losing conventionally as opposed to trying new approaches?

The question is by no means new.

ESPN.com’s Gregg Easterbrook criticizes coaches constantly in his “Tuesday Morning Quarterback” column for punting when their team is behind by a large margin. Such a move, he argues, does not increase the chances of winning, but keeps the score down—preventing the coach from looking bad.

However, the problem goes beyond that. NFL teams seem incredibly resistant to running any scheme that differs from the “business-as-usual” game plans, even when the talent is available to do so.

Take Mike Vick’s career so far as an example (and let’s ignore his moral lapses for the time being). Vick is a talented athlete, as we all know. Still, he has limitations. He’s fast and has a strong arm, but he’s not especially accurate (his highest completion percentage in the league has been 56 percent).

What did Atlanta Falcons head coach Jim Mora, Jr. do with Vick? Mora had Vick run the West Coast offense, an offense predicated on timing, quick decisions and accuracy.

Why did Mora do this? It’s because Mora was an assistant under Steve Marriucci, who is another West Coast devotee. Mora did this because that’s what he was taught and what many teams in the league had been doing.

Mora, in short, ignored the talent available to him to implement the “tried and true” method.

The irony of this is that the West Coast offense was originally an innovative scheme designed to exploit the talents of players ignored by the NFL. Bill Walsh designed his scheme while he was with the Bengals to accommodate a weak-armed but accurate quarterback and receivers who weren’t going to blow by anyone.

Vick is now a free agent, and presumably has a better chance of signing with a team that will use his talents more effectively (assuming, of course, the team is willing to take on the bad publicity).

I’m not singling out specific teams here—the league seems full of this kind of mentality. Look at the Detroit Lions last year. What could they have lost by trying unconventional game plans? They couldn’t have gone 0-17.

The Lions, though, continued to play conventionally and lost regularly to teams with more talent.

The Bengals and Bills leveraged their “No-Huddle” offenses into Super Bowl appearances. Both teams now run very conventional offenses, and both have been lousy for the past decade.

So, it becomes somewhat frustrating that so many teams are looking to adopt the Wildcat, but are ignoring the thinking behind it. The Wildcat is not, in itself, a superior scheme. It can be, and has been, defended well.

The true lesson of the Wildcat is that less-talented teams should consider success through unconventional means.

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